Our Analytics 30 september — 11:07

What does Heydar Aliyev have to do with it? (Our response to Chamberlain)

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BY EYNULLA FATULLAYEV

In modern political science, the theory of misinformation occupies a special place and plays a peculiar role. Of course, a dangerous science and dangerous art. But only if the hearing aid is started with skilful hands and golden lips. Undoubtedly, in the age of hybrid wars, any state should have established and developed this system, which causes a chain reaction and avalanche-like consequences.

The theory of misinformation is also being prepared in the domestic political struggle. For example, the misinformation about the relationship between US President Trump and Russian intelligence, skilfully launched by the Democrats on the eve of the elections, still haunts this politician like a long trail of trouble. However, any misinformation launched into public opinion should be at least similar to the truth or look like the truth, and must certainly be transformed into a public information field.

The digital revolution has created a unique rumour-maker - social networks that knock at your door every minute. One turns on one's iPhone, and on the waves of the Internet, rumours or misinformation wins over one's mind.

However, a misinformation apparatus is a dangerous thing. Despite the popularity of the misinformation field, the source working with this device risks losing not only its reputation, but also public trust. After the loss of public trust and the reputation of a reliable source of information, the device ceases to work. Society realises: there is ordinary sabotage.

Everything should be calculated to the smallest detail. Say, sources that recently spread rumours about the death of the president of Turkmenistan, primarily relied on the closed regime of official information services of this country. And in some ways, the expectations and calculations of the authors of misinformation were justified: in the region for many weeks there was a stir around the absence of the head of state. And there are many such examples in modern hybrid and cyber warfare.

The Azerbaijani opposition, especially recently, has taken the theory of misinformation as the conceptual basis of its activities. Canards, permanently launched by the frontists, have reached their climax in recent months. And the Popular Front, along with Ali Karimli, do not care about preserving the reputation and saving their face. The opposition lost the main battle in their long-lasting, almost eternal political struggle. At first, the potential protest electorate, and now the active social base of opponents of the government of Ilham Aliyev, completely buried hopes of a possible change in the political situation, and then said goodbye to the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow dream of a change of power.

Once on the periphery of the political system, a handful of opposition members resort to a priori failed methods of information warfare.

The image of strong government and a strong president is rooted in public consciousness. In a natural way of political struggle, this image cannot be destroyed. Although they resort to big lies, sometimes they speculate with objective problems and manipulate the deficiencies of an imperfect and not fully formed formation characteristic of the countries of the CIS. In vain: the rooted image cannot be broken. In its passionate desire to achieve at any cost the illusion of a weakening of power, because only in this case the opposition expects to provoke centrifugal forces and undermine the core mechanism of the political system - systemic stability, the Popular Front Party began to resort to illicit means of struggle - obscene language and calls for the overthrow of power. In vain! Doesn't work too!

And in their reckless tactics of spreading 'rumours' dangerous to the authorities, the frontists began to resort to such misinformation methods that they began to cause general grumble and laughter. Moreover, the central figure in this rumour-spreading machine is the head of all Karimli's information resources - Ganimat Zahid. The opposition in this case also makes a fatal mistake. After all, by reducing the already shaky trust in Ganimat Zahid as a source of information, the frontists undermine the basis of the foundations - trust in the PFPA media. Brainless oppositionists themselves help the authorities in every way and seem to play along with it. Who, after this, will begin to believe Zahid's investigative journalism and his 'accusatory reporting'? Once a liar...

Fresh example. A few weeks ago, Ganimat Zahid disseminates information that President Ilham Aliyev has left the country forever. Then he unexpectedly makes a correction: no, it turns out that the president is preparing to transfer power to the first vice-president. A day later, another sensation: the head of state with a serious illness was hospitalised in one of the foreign private clinics. Part of the online community even believed the adventurer. After all, may be someone else can use unverified information, but not the head of all information services of the opposition! And what do you think? Against the backdrop of these conflicting reports, only a few hours later, the president appears on live television in full health, well rested and in a good mood at a meeting with the heads of foreign intelligence services. And how does Zahid explain the disavowal with the mere appearance of the president of his many canards? Simple. That's not him! Who then? A double! Ha ha ha...

The author of the canard does not understand the elementary truths of political technology: the more complex and inaccessible the content of misinformation, the weaker its information field. Moreover, is it worth risking the reputation of a serious journalist - an investigator of anti-corruption - if any information can be refuted instantly? After that, the reader begins to suspect any information and all the investigations of the author of intentional misinformation.

But Zahid continues to replicate canards in the vile and immoral form characteristic of him. Further more. This rogue presents a sty in the president's eye as a dangerous disease... That is, right before our eyes, Karimli's herald turns into a yellow disgusting creature that sincerely violates the taboo for a decent person. Although what decency can we talk about when it comes to Ganimat Zahid? To this day, our colleagues from the Azadlig newspaper bitterly recall how they were left without a salary or fees, because the dodger Zahid took the entire budget of the party to a brothel, where he had fun with disgusting prostitutes...

And on the eve, he resorts to another disgusting trick: he launches an awkward, oligophrenic misinformation about the president's son - Heydar Aliyev. As you know, recently Heydar Aliyev successfully completed his military service, having fulfilled his duty to the Motherland, unlike the offspring of the opposition leaders who ran from the country.

Pay attention to disinformation, which absolutely lacks logic and intent. Zahid writes that in the coming days, the State Security Service will conduct some kind of special operation, and a little later the public will find out that the president's son also participated in this operational event. Then, the official media will distribute a video of this special operation with the participation of Heydar Aliyev to promote the 'new strong member of the ruling team.' Ganimat Zahid claims that one of the employees of the State Security Service leaked this information to him. And for some reason, the information was distributed by the journalist in the Azerbaijani and Talysh languages.

As for the plot of misinformation, first of all, Heydar Aliyev completed his military service a few months ago. Second, the troops of the State Security Service, where the president's son served, do not take part in operational investigations. Indeed, for this, the State Security Service has its own special forces. Third, let's say the son of the president will appear in some video frame. So what? And why Ganimat Zahid, who does not speak Talysh, duplicates this information in this language? Why should a journalist disseminate information in a language that he not only does not speak, but which he does not understand. We ask why he did not replicate this, for example, in Urdu? Or Uyghur? Or in Farsi? It is likely that he did so for the purpose of this misinformation falling into small and unpopular separatist network groups. So, what is next? Goal? Well, it doesn't exist. Just for fun. He took and came up with a disgusting information crossword puzzle. Without a goal.

All methods have been exhausted, and now Zahid began to incite ethnic hatred? And what does the president's son have to do with it? What did Zahid want to say? And even if the author of the misinformation apparatus intentionally resorts to undermining the reputation of the president, his family and son, how can this damage the powers that be? Well, they show Heydar Aliyev on a TV channel. Well, someone gives him flattering assessments. And then what? What?

All this can be characterised only by the author having congenital dementia or deep oligophrenia. I myself, knowing Zahid firsthand, never doubted this. The complete absence of a logical chain and sequence of thought. More precisely, there is no thought, only fragments...

Here are the characters you have to deal with in the virtual political arena of Azerbaijan. And our happiness is that these people were knocked out of real politics.

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